Frum the puint uf view uf an ewnumist lhe purely pulitical analyscs ul' cunlli~t uvcr arms Ju nut pay atlcyuatc attrntiun tu the " guns vcrsus buttcr"~il~mma. A hibh~r Iwcl uf invc,tm~nt in wcapuns cvcntually incrcases lhe fetaing uf sccurily anJ thus wcll:u e, but it al,u means that thcre are Icss resuurt:cs availabl~fur priv:ttc ccwr cun~umptiun anJ thrr~lbrc welfare Jiminishcs. A varicty uf stuJics cmpluy uptimal~untrul anJ~i1Trr~ntial game lhcury tu analyse the inlertempural u:,Je-ulis -Ihr .~uth~~r, ,,ir~i.,i.lul tur thc cuoetrucnvc cummcnle ul Ihc nnunymuu~releterv and ul I~ou, liiuut. An vvihc~~ri aon w.,, p~r.rNaJ lu a C'utdci~~nrc un Lcunum~c Mpcclo uf Intrinrlwn.,l S~~rwuy, Ch:,tham Iluuu, LuuJun, Junc IvtlG, uróamxd by thr l'cntre fur Liwnumic Pultcy Ncxarch.
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F. VAN DEH PLOE~G AND A. 1. DE "LEEUW inhcrrnt in such "guns versus bulter" dilemmas (e.g. Brito 1972; Dcgcr and Scn I'1ti41. "hhe pruhlcm wilh the dilTercntial game swdics is that thcy cun~id~r uprn-luup Nash cyuilibrium solutiuns whcreas feedback Nash cyuilibrium sulutions are morc apprupriate fur two reasons. Firstly, lhe fcedback mudcl cmpluys murc realistic infurmatiun patterns, since each cuuntry can nuwadays be assumcd tu be able tu munitur the current Ievels of each other's weapun stucks rather than unly the initial levels. Secondly, the linear-yuadratic feedback mudel provides a strategic underpinning of the Richardson eyuations, which show up as first-order cunditions for uptimal investment behaviuur in arms. The inCormatiunal nonuniyuencss resulting from closed-luop information patterns with memory (E3a~ar and OlsJer 1982) is resulved when the principle of subgame-perfectness (Selten 1975 ) is imposed, which has the added advanlage that the resulting feedback equilibrium strategies are credible. The fcedback approach to the prublem of competitive arms accumulation was proposed before (Simaan and Cruz 1975) , but that paper dues not give a full characterisation of the strategic equilibrium, so that it was not possible to compare the levels of weapon stocks in the feedback approach with the Ievels in the open-loop approach and to perform comparative statics with respect to Ihe undcrlying parameters of the behavioural model.
The main objectives of this paper are lo provide a more satisfactory slrategic fuundation of the Richardson mudel and to show that the subgame-perfect Nash cquilibrium Ieads tu less weapon accumulation in buth countries than the upen-loup Nash eyuilibrium. This means that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is murc elFicient, since both countries ubtain higher welfare as they can consume mure guuds and leisure without feeling less secure. The policy conclusion is that huth cuuntries shouW be encouragcd to monitor each other's weapon stocks. The :tnalysis is set up as follows. There are two countries involved in the arms race. The West is a decentralised marke[ ecunomy whose government maximises the discounted utility of a representative household and levies lump-sum taxes in ordcr to (inance investment in arms and pruvide a public gcwd, defence. The East is a centrally planned economy. Utility in both countries is a function of consumptiun, Ieisure and defence. Defence is a characteristic which depends on the difference bctween home and foreign weapon stocks. When consumption and leisure arc normal goods, thcre is a"guns versus butter" dilemma as more taxes lead to mure weapons at the expense uf less consumptiun and leísure. Seciion 2 furmulates this twu-country mudcl. The model is kept as simple as possible. Extensions tu mure gencral utility functiuns, disturtionary taxalion in the West or other furmulatiuns, which pay more attention tu the JilTerent ecunomic systems of the two cuuntrics, do nut changc Ihe results uf this papcr on the impact uf informatiun. Scction 3 J~rives the main cuoperative outcomc of the resulting dilterential game and shows that coupcratiun Icads to a muratorium on inveslmenl in wcapuns. Section 4 givcs the nuncuuperativc Nash equilibrium for the case where countries cannut obscrve thcir rival's cun-ent weapun stuck. Sectiun 5 gives the perfect equilibrium, which currespunds to thc case where counlries can monitor their rival's current wcapun stuck. It is shuwn that thís approach is more efficient, leads to less weapun accumul.rtiun and provides a more satisfactory strategic underpinning uf the Richardson eyuatiuns. 'fhe resulting parametcrs of the Richardsun eyuations are cumpareJ wilh what wuulJ result with the upen-luop approach anJ a scnsitivity analy,is for these p:rram~ters with respect to the underlying parameters of the muJcl is p~rfurmcJ. Scctiun 6 attcnJs tu thc casc in which one of thc cuunu~ics trics tu bccume a Stackclberg leader by announcing its pulicy beforehanJ. lt is shuwn that the open-luop Stackelberg equilibrium leads to less weapun accumulatiun than Ihc curresponJing Nash equilibrium anJ makes the IeaJer worse off than lhe fulluwcr. The feeJback Stackelberg equilibrium, as well as the feedback consistent cunjectures eyuilibrium, coincides with the feedback Nash equilibrium. Sectiun 7 concludes thc paper anJ contains some suggestions fur further research.
Z. 7~HE "GUNS VEKSUS UUTTGK" UILEMMA
The West is a JecentraliseJ market economy with a representative householJ, a represcntative firm anJ a government. There are no domestic or fureign financial assets anJ the economy dces not engage in international trade. Therc is nu private capital accumulation, althuugh the government Jces invest in weapun stocks.
There is only une Jomestically pruduceJ commudity, which can be used fur bulh consumption anJ investment purposes. The government demands guods fur investment, the huuseholJ supplies labuur and demands goods for consumptiun, anJ thc firm JemanJs labour anJ supplies guuds. The real wage adjusts in urJer to ensure labour market eyuilibrium. The guvernment finances the investment in arms, i.e., the provision of [he public goud defence, by meuns of nondisturtionary taxatiun anJ maximises the utility of the representative householJ. The huusehulJ maximises utility u (c, !, J) , where c, I unJ d Jenote eonsumption, labour supply anJ Jefence, subject tu its budget constraint 0~c s w! t a-z, where w,~r anJ r Jenut~the rcal wag~, prufits anJ lump-sum taxes, respectively. Utility is assumcJ tu b~srparable in J~fcnce. U~fence is a characteristic (ef. Laneaster 1966), which is an increasing I'unctiun of the uwn weapun stock, u, anJ a Jecreasing functiun uf thc furcign weapun stuck, u', that is d -D(u, u') . Fw~thermure, il is assumeJ that an eyual increase in buth hume anJ foreign weapon stocks leaves the Icvel uf J~fence or security unatTccleJ, that is D" (u, u') --U,,.(u, u') 1 U. For an int~riur wlutiun, thc marginul ratc uf substitutiun betwcen leisure, I-!, anJ cunsumptiun cyuals the rcal uppurwnity cust uf leiswe, that is -uthr,. -w. The firm maximixs prulits n -J(!) -u.l, whcrc f is a cuncave pruductiun function, which yiclJs rr -J'(I ). GuuJs mark~t ryuilibrium inrplics J(!) -c t y, whcre y Jcnutcs thc Icvcl uf guvcrnmcnt invcatn)~nt, anJ th~guvcrnmcnt's buJg~t cunstraint is y-r. It fulluw, that thr inJir~ct wihty I'unctiun fur thc guvcrnn)ent can, withuut luss uf g~ner~lity, b~writtcn ai
whrr~U ' -u, C" t rrrL', (" -lu, J" t u~~t u,rl')IJ. L' --(ur, t u,, J')l.~.rnJ -~--~u,J" r uu~'u,rJ' t u"(J') The separable specifications of utility investigated so far ( see van Jer Plocg anJ Jc Zccuw 1989) shuw the same role of information, so that the main result of this paper seems to be robust with respect to alterations in the utility functiun. In order tu be able to obtain analytical sulutiuns a seconJ-urder Taylor series approximatiun u( indirect utilily is aJupted. If preferences are quaJratic anJ technulugy is lincar, the approximatiun is exact. This yielJs a strategic unJerpinning of the Richardsun eyuatiuns anJ enables a comparison of dilTerent game equilibria as wcll as a sensitivity analysis with respect tu the unJerlying parameters of the modcl. The yuaJratic approximatiun is given by
whcre j-(lil0. anJ rA -d}IB~1 0 can be intcrpreteJ as the target Ievel of public ,pcnJing .~nJ thc JcsireJ IeaJ in weapon stucks, respectively. The assumption uf nurmal~,uuJs, U' -(l i-fl.y c 0, implics thal g~g fur all y? 0, su thut Bt~ll mutit hulJ. l hc intcrtcmpural utility of the Wcst for the problem starting at time t iti givrn by thc infinitc-hurizon valuc functiun
whcrc r is the rate uf líme preferenc~. The West ntaximises V(U, u~, u~), wherc u:
rnJ u~are the initial wcapun stocks, subjecl tu the arms accumulatiun fur humc weapuns
hcre S is the depreciatiun r:,te, anJ similarly fur fureign weapuns. The Jil~mma uf "guns vcrsus butter" is that high taxes are requireJ to finance a I:rrge buildup uf weapons, but this necessarily implies less private consumption and leisure.
Th~East is a commanJ ur centrally planned econumy. The variables in the East arc Jcnoted by un astcrisk. Becuuse the purpuse of the paper is unly tu shuw the impact uf monitoring, it is assumed that the East has the same technulugies anJ preferences as the West. The government plans c', 1 ' and g' to maximise utility, u(c', f', d') , subjcct tu the material balance condition, jU') -c' t y'. This yielJs the same inJirect utili[y funclion as in lhe West, U(y') t D (u', u) .
The JecentraliseJ market econumy of the West and the centrally planned ecunumy uf the East are identical, because identical technologies and preferences huve been assumcJ anJ because no distortions or market imperfections have becn consiJereJ und therefure lhc fundamental theurem of welfare economics holJs. lf the West had tu levy Jistortiunary taxes on labour income, there wuulJ be asymmetries anJ lhe East anJ West wuuld not have the same indirect utility functiun. With identical technolugies and preferences, the tax dislortiuns in the West imply luwer lev~ls uf empluymcnt, uutput and consumptiun fur a given Ievel uf guvernmcnt investment in arms. Huwever, the cunclusions with respect tu thc cumparisun of JilTerent game eyuilibria will be the sume (see van der Ylucg anJ Je "Le~uw 19t39). Anuther furm uf asymmclry betwcen the two ecunomies uccurs wh~n une alluws fur rióiJ wag~s anJ prices in the short run, because then the West is lik~ly tu be in a rrgimc uf Keynesiun uncmpluyment and the East in a regime uf rcpre~~cJ inllatiun (scc MalinvauJ 1977).
CUUI'LKA"I~IVE UBHAVIUUK
Par~tu-clli~i~nt uulcumes fur the Jitl'er~ntial game furmulatcJ in Sectiun 2 arf uunJ frum lhc maximi~auun with respect lu y anJ y' uf 
One interpretution of (6) through (7) is that the "rental" charge plus the deprcciatiun charge minus thc capital gains term defines the user cost uf weapuns and should match the marginal utility of weapons lo the world. If equal weights are attached to the West and the East (a -Il2), il (ollows that in the steady state A-A' -0, as in the steady state (ur when the initial weapon stocks of the two countries are the samc) the game is zero-sum at the margin with respect to u and u' (i.e.,
) -0 and similarly the sum of margin:rl utilities of defence with respect to the fureign weapon stock is zero). For Br~U the slcaJy-state couperalive outcome is a corner solution, but for B~-U the corner sulution coincides with the uncunstrained sulution. To avoid corner solutiuns, both in this seclion and in later sections, and to ensure that the assumption of normul guods is satisfied for all g z 0, the value of Oi can be taken to be zero. It folluws that in the steady state y-g' -u-a' -0, so that the cooperative outcome is to havc a moraturium un investment in weapons and lu run down weapon stucks until these have fallcn to zero. This analysis Ieans heavily on the property that the game is zero-sum at lhe maróin, which is satisfied because the defence characteristic dcpends upun the di0~crence in arms levcls. For example, when it depends also upon the sum of arms Icvcls and is giv~n by
with Ot, Oh ? U, thc gamc is nu longer zcro-sum at thc margin in thc lung run. "I'his scI-up can casily bc shown to result in
su that when buth cuuntries want a positive stock of weapuns between Ihc lwu uf thcm (OS~UI thcir sleaJy-state Icvels uf weapuns will be posilive. This dcfcnce chara~lerititic may be realistic when the two countrics want a positive sluck uf wcapuns tu act as a detcrrcnce fur third counlrics. Thc transicnt coupcrativc sulutiun is bcsl ubtaincd by sulving fur Ihe glubal averages and glubal dilTcrenccs scparalely. This i~pussiblc, becautie (u -u') and (A -A') on the une hand and CUMPETffIVE AKMS ACC'UMULATION 137 ll'(u t u`) and 1~2(A t,1') on the other hand form two decoupled subsystems of ditlcrential eyuatiuns. Application of this procedure and sume algebraic manipulatiu~u yicld the cuupt:rative lrajectory In the absence of a mechanism which enforces the cooperative outcume, each country has an incentive to deviate by increasing its security at the expense of its rival, if the desired IeuJ in weapons is positive ( U3 1 0) . Therefore the cuoperative outcome will unly be considered as a benchmark fur the relative efficiency uf the ditlerent nuncooperative outcomes, which will be considered in the next sections.
4.
Ut'EN-LUUt' NASIi E(~UILIUKIUM Cunsid~r the situutiun where the West and the East du not couperatc anJ wh~rc nrith~r cuuntry Juminatcs the arms race, so that a Nash equilibrium is apprupriate.
"1-h~N~~h~yuilibrium cunccpt cun lead to dilia:rent types uf sulutions when applicd tu dill~rential gamcs (e.g. Starr anJ Hu 1964a, b). In ordcr to analysc th~prublcm uf cumpctitive arms accumulatiun Brito (1972) employed the upevrluup Na,h eyuilibrium cuncept. This cuncept presumes that the investments in anns at ca~h puint in um~are only conJitiuned on the initial weapun stucks, u~anJ u~, anJ that ea~h cuuntry precummu, nself tu a path uf invcstmcnt in arms. It fulluws that thc cxpcctrJ invcstmcnts uf the rival du nut dcpcn~un past ur currcnt wcapun stucl.,, ur un past or cuncnt inveslnxnts uf thc cuwnry undcr cun,iJcr:,tiun. 'fhc cxpcctatiun~uf c~ch uthcr's path uf invcstmcnt arc currect in cyuilibrium. In uiJrr tu bc ablc lu cumpare thc upcn-luup Nash cyuilibrium with othcr cyuilibri~in thc ncxt scctiuns it will b~fully charactcri~cJ in this scctiun. l'he tirsl-urJcr cunditiun,, which rc,ult frum Nuntryagin's maximum principle, givc nse tu The steady-state levels of weapon stocks are positive, which can be interprctcJ as Ihe familiar deterrence or "balance uf terror" argument. They increase whcn the discuunt rate or the depreciation rate decreases, when the rclative priurity uf "butter" rather than " guns" ( 9,IBa) decreases, and when the desired lead in weapon stocks over the rival country ( B31t3a) increases. The steady slate is a sadJlcpoint, since there are two stable eigenvalues
assuciated with the backward-looking variables, a and a', and two unstable cibcnvalues (r t S and
Il2[r t (r t 2S) t 8B4IBZ])
associatcJ with the furward-looking variables, A and A'. Since ( I l) through (14) is elCectively a perfect-foresight syslem, Buiter's ( 1984) method of spectral dccumpusition or the method of undetermineJ coeliicients can be useJ tu solve it. lt can be shown that the stable manifold is given by A-~roBz(u' -u) t d3~(r t S), where~~-
su that y-ytr t~a (u`-u) . lt follows that investment in weapuns is higher than its steady-state Icvel when fureign weapon stocks exeeed hume weapun stucks and that the marginal increase in investment, yo, increases when the discuunt ralc ur the depreciatiun rate decreases and when the relative priority of "butter" rather than "guns" (O.Ipa) dccreases. Upun substitution one obtains
which is a stable systcm as the eigenvalues assucialed with (16) through (17) (-S and -2~rr -S) arc both negative. Nulc that an increase in the deprcciation ratc incrcases thc magnitudc of buth cigenvalucs anJ therefure spccds up the ruute lu the steady stalr. Equations (16) thruugh (17) can be louked upon as Kichardsun's (I`)60) cyuations, whcre~ru is the "defcnce" coelficicnt, ye t S the "fatiguc" cuetlicicnt and y~the "grievance" or "hatred" cueiiicient. Howevrr, this intrrpretatiun scems inapprupriate in view of the open-loop nature of the sululion cuncept. In lhe open-loop Nash equilibrium the countries cannut cunditiun their investments on currrnt weapon stocks, so that y-yu t~o(u' -u) should be intcrpretcd as a relatiun between the optimal seyuence of levels oC investment and the resulting sequence of weapon stucks, and not as a feedback strategy fur investmcnt in arms. Olsder (1977) Equations (16) 
(19) u(r) -u(~)[I -exp (-Sr)] t Il2(u~t uS) exp (-St) t Il2(uo -ua) exp [-(2~~t S)t]
and similarly 1'ur y' and u', where u(~) -yolS. When both countrirs start with identical weapun stocks (uu -uó), investment in weapons is always at its steady-state Irvel (y(r) -g~, fur all r~0) and any excess of the initial Icvcl uC weapun stucks over the steady-state level is gradually eliminated at the rate uf dcpreciatiun. When the rival wuntry's initial weapon stock exceeds the home initial weapon stuck, the hume cuuntry's investment in weapons exceeds the steady-state level. The speed at which the dilTrrence in initial weapun stocks is eliminatcd, 2~c t S--Il2[r -(r t 2S)2 t Bd~IdZ J, increases when the discuunl rate decrcases and when thr depreciation ra[e or the relative priurity uf "guns" rather than "butter" increaacs. This speed uf adjustment can easily be shuwn tu bc Icss than the specd uf adjustment uf the cuuperative outcome (-~"~in Sectiun 3), so that Iack of coopcration sluws duwn adjustment.
Since thc marginal values of Eastcrn wcapun stocks lu the Wesl and vict vcna do nut alTect lhe opcn-luop Nash eyuilibrium, it dues nut matter whethcr thc cuuntrics obscrvc thcir own weapon stuck or nut. This mcans that thc upcn-luup Na~h ryuibbriwn al,u Jeticribes the situation whcre each country muniturs its uwn w~apun stock, but nut thr wcapun stuck of the rival cuunU'y. 7~hc ncxt scctiun wnaidcrs the situatiun where euch cuunuy can alsu munitur the fureign wcapun stu~k.
NLKI-LC"r NASH LUUILIUkIUM
7~hc clu~rJ-luup N.~,h cywGbrium alluws rach cuuntry tu cunJiuun hs iuvc,tm~nt in weapuns un the current anJ past slu~ks uf wcapuns. "fhis typc uf I-3U F. VAN UGK PLULG ANU A. J. UL ZGEUW infurmatiun structurc admits, umong othcrs, memury und thrcal strategics, su th:~t the sulutiun sct is nununiyuc ( lia~ar and OlsJcr 19ë2). Huwever, if thc principlc ul subgame perf~ctncss ( S~Iten 1975) is impus~d, then uniyueness typically result,. "Chc uutcume will be called lh~subgume-perfecr Nash eyuilibrium. This eyuilibriunc unc~pt in clused-loup strategies, which will depend unly upon the current w~apun stocks uf the twu cuuntries, requires that for each subgame the relevant part uf the set uf strategies is in Nash equilibrium. A subgame in this context is a game uv~r the remaindcr of the time horizun, that is over [i,~) rathcr than [U,~). "I'hc restriction uf the solution to a subgame must be a Nash equilibrium for all i E [U,~) and fur all possible levels o! weapon stocks at t. Each country expects thc other country to react ratiunally at time i to the informatiun about the current w~apon stucks al time iand in equilibrium these expectatiuns are currect. Subgamc pcrfectncss rules out threat equilibria, which rely on informatiun patterns with mcmury, and equilibria which imply future investments that are not rational tu carry uut if called upon to do so in the future. This setup is analoguus tu the requirement that the sulution to the ditïerential game has to salisfy Bellman's principle uf optimality. In that cuntext Starr and Ho (1IG9b) and Simaan and Cruz ( I`17S) refcr to the uutcume as the jrrdbuck Nash equilibrium. The subgame-prrfcct or feedback Nash equilibrium can be fuund by dynamic programming. hrre is unly unc stcady state uf (23) through (27) which ensures that thc matrix P ii pu,ihve scmi-Jefinite. This stesJy state is given by
The maximisalion in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman eyuation for the West yicl~s y-(V" t U t)IB, -G(t, u, u'), where V(~, u, u') is the value functiun fur thc

S)pz t U~t~lUi tPi)lPiz t P") t p,Pii~~Uz
I'il !'n -Ir t ZS)P~i t lPii t 2Yi,1lU, -U( 't,) I'" -(r t?bIP,. t lJT'1z t 2P~~P")IUz -U~
!t fullows that the invcstment strategics in the perfect Nash equilibrium are givcn by y-y~t~io(u' -u) and y' -y~t~~(u -u') whcre (3U)~o~PuIB, 70
and whcrc lhc steady-state level of investmenl yD~0 is givcn by
As in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the sleady-state levels of investment in weapun stucks, yo (the grievance coefiicient), and the marginal incrcase in inve~tment, y~(lhe defcnce coetticient), increase when the discuunt rate ur the dcpreciation rate decreases and when the relative priority of "butter" rather than "guns" ( d.IB4) dccreases, and the steady-state levels of weapon stocks ina-ease when lhe desired Iead in weapon stocks over the rival country (B3IBa) increases. Upon substitution of the investment strategy of the West in ( 4) one obtains
and similarly fur the East. In contrast with the results uf the open-loup Nash analysis, it secros apprupriale to view lhese equatiuns as Richardson's (19G0) cyuatiuns, as investments in arms in the perfect Nash equilibrium are conditiuned un thc ub~crvahlc wc:~pun stocks. Olsder (1977) calls the investment strategies lhe "cluscd-luup, open-cye" representatiun of the clused-loop sululiun in cuntrast with the "closed-loup, closcd-eye" representation, which refers to the expected seyucnce uf levcls of investment in arms for the closed-loop solution. It fulluws that it i, mcaningful to cun,ider the perfect Nash eyuilibrium for the Jilicrential bamc furnwlateJ in Scction 2 as the strategic underpinning of the Richardsun eyuatiuns with~,J' us the defcnce coefficient,~o t S as the fatigue ccelTicient and yY as the grievance ur hatred we(Ticient. Obviously, it is possible to integrate (32) uvcr timc to givc the analogues of (18) (the "clused-loop, closcd-eye" rcpresentalion) and (19) with yo and y~~rcplaccJ by yo anJ~~.
"I'he most inleresting aspecl of the cumparison belween the opcn-luop Na~h equilibrium and the perfect Nash eyuilibrium is that munitoring uf fureign wcapun stucks decreascs the grievance coelticient (yo~yo), su that monitoring Icads to Icss accumulatiun uf wcapon stocks than in the abscnce uf moniwring. Thc intuition bchinJ this retiult is that, when une country considers the purchase uf une aJJitiun:~l unit uf wcapuns, it cunsiJcrs the Jircct marginal contributiun lu sccurily und wclfare, U,,, but it also cunsiJ~rs thc stratcgic rcacliun of the rival. 'Chc rival I,~~F. VAN Ut:k F'Ll)LG ANU A. J. UE LLLUW will ubscrvc the aJditiunal purchase anJ will C~el less secure, su that it will aliu pw-ch~se murc weapuns. Thercfure the marginul contributiun tu security anw cll~re i~rcduccd tu D" t~yoV,,. c D,, , su lhat there is less incentive tu invcst in weapuns lh:~n wh~n cuuntries cannot ubserve their rival's weapun stuck. Since thp crfect Nash cquilibriwn Ieads to mure " butter" and less " guns," but with lhs anu feeling uf security, it is more etlicient than the open-loup Nash cyuilibrium. The ubviuus pulicy implication is that countries shuuld be encouraged tu muniwr ach uthcr's weapon stucks as this will lead to some unilatcral disarmument and higher welfare. Anuthcr feature of munitoring is that the defence cucflicicnt can easily be shuwn to be larger than without munitoring (yo~~y~)-lt folluws that the udjusunent to the ( luwer) stcady-state levels of arms is faster than in the ubs~ncc uf monituring. Huwever, this spced of adjustment cun tx shown to be still Icss thun the specd of aJjustment of the cooperative outcume ( 2yo t 8~-w,J). Nute that, when def~nce is a linear function uf the did'erence in weapun stucks (Ha -0), the defence coetficients are zero (~o -~o -0) and lhe grievance cucliicicnt is independent of whether countries can monitor their rival's weapun stuck ur not (y~-y~)-ln fact fur this special case the open-luup and subgamepcrf~ct Nash equilibria cuincide and therefore monitoring does nut inftuence thc:
Icvcls uf weapon stucks. This result gcneralises to the case where defencc is sep:uable in hume an~furcign weapun stucks ( van der Ylocg and de "Leeuw I~l2iy). Finally, nute lh~l, when n~ither cuunlry attempts lo establish a Iead in weapun stucks ( BJ -0), thc nuncuuperative equilibria ( with or wilhout munituring thc rival's weapun stuck) cuincide with the cuuperative outcome with a muratorium un invc,lnunt in wcapuns.
G. STACKELHEKG LEADEKSNIP
Tl~is~~~tiun cun,i~crs the situatiun where une of the countrics attcmpts tu impruvc its wclfare by announcing its investmcnts ín arms or its inv~stmcnt tratcgy bcfurehund, su that a Stuckelberg equilibrium is apprupriate. As for thc Nash cyuilíbriwn cuncept it is possible to distinguish the upen-luup Stackclb.:rg cyuilibrium withuut munituring and the subbame-perfect or fecdback Stackelberg cyuilibrium wilh munituring. Cunsidcr first the upcn-luup Stuckclbcrg eyuihbrium (sce e.6-6ay.~r and UI~Jcr I')Z;'1 with th~Wcsl as thc Icadcr an~lhc Easl us lhc fulluwcr. "fhe IcaJrr i; u,umrJ tu be ablc tu precommit itsclC tu an annuunccJ scyucncc uf invcsunent Icv~l, in :,rms. y hc raUun:J rcactiun of the fullowcr is y`-(a' t flt )~t1: whcre A' i~giv~n by (Id).~fhi, iniplics that thc fulluwcr's level of invcstmcnt in~rms i, ch:~r:~ctcriscd by Ihc~lill~rential eyualiun
'I-hc Icadcr thcn ma~uniics its intertcmpural ulility V(U, uc, u~), givcn by (31. suhjcct tu thc arm, accuniulatiun fur hume an~furcibn wcapun~, (4), an~~ubjc~t lu thr r.itiunal rcactiun ul the Culluwer, (33). "fhc first-ur~cr cunditiuns bive ri~e tu (4) fur u~n~u`, (33) anJ where A, and y, dcnute the Ieader's "shadowprices" of the forcign weapon stuck and the foreign investment level, respeclively. Note that as far as the leader is cuncerned, lhe folluwer's ínvestment level, y', is free to jump al time zcro and theretore its marginal contribution to the Icader's welfare at that time musl be zeru, so that~(0) -0. The stcady state of (4) and (33) Both countries accumulate less weapuns than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, but the leader accumulates less weapons than the follower (q:~g" c yu) Hence, the wortd is a kss safe place because "balance of terror" is disturbed. The leader is always at least as well od in lhe open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium as in the upen-luop Nash equilibrium, because it has the option not to exploit thc fullower's reaction curve. It folluws that the loss in security, due to less arms accumulatiun than the rival, is outweighed by the gain in "butter." The folluwer also has a highcr wclfare than in the open-loop Nash equilibrium, because it can consume mure "butter" and has a higher level of security. Finally, it can be shown, after considerable algebraic manipulation, that the leader is worse o8'' than the folluwer in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, because the disadvantage of less security excceds the advantage of more "butter" (D(a", u') -D(as, u") ~U(q') -U(y's) where us and u" are the steady-state levels of weapon stocks in the open-loop Stackclbcrg equilibrium). Obviously, one gels the same results with the East as the leader and the West as the follower, so that there is a stalemate in thut ncither the West nor the East wishes to be leader.
The leader's optimal sequence of levels of investment in arms is time-incunsistent (Kydland and Prescott 1977) . The leader has an incentive to announce a relalivcly luw level of investment in arms in order to inducc the follower to du thc same and, once the fullower has lucked itself into a low Ievel of investmcnt in arms, it pays the Icader tu renege and increase its security anJ welfare by investing morc in arms. This can be seen from the fact that the shadowprice of the toreign invcstment levcl, u, is stricUy pusitive fur t) U, whereas reuptimising at a later stage would iniply that~is reset to zeru. It follows that the Icader incrcases its investmcnt in anns whcn it rcncf,cs. One sulution to this prublcm uf timcincunsistency is the "loss-of-Ieadership" sulutiun (Buiter 1983), which replaccs stucks. It can be shown, after considerable algebraic manipululiun, that whcn thc relaUve priority of "butter" rather than "guns" ( B2I84) is very high the monituring furce dominates and that therefore the imposition of subgame pcrfectness fur thS tackelberg equilibrium also leads to less weapon stucks (yp c y' c y"). ln [he Stackelberg equilibrium it is assumed that one of the cuunlrics reacts rationally to the investments in arms or lhe investment strategy uf the rival cuunu y anJ that this rival cuunlry chooses an optimal inveslment pulicy, which tuk~s accuunt of that ratiunal reaction. The consistent conjectural varialiuns equilibriwn (liresnahan 1981) atlempts to capture this idea fur the two countries at unce by intruJucing conjectured reaction coePficients fur both cuuntries, which havc tu bc unsistenl with lhe actual reaction cuefficients. Although lhis eyuilibrium cuncrpl is lugically nut v~ry well founded ( de Zeeuw and van der Plueg 1987), it wuuld again lead, fur the problcm of competitive arms accumulatiun, to lhe same subgamcpcrfect cyuilibrium.
Í.
CuNCLUDING KEMAKKS "fhe cunflict uv~r arms accumulation between two countries, whus~guvcrnmcntc un,iJcr a"guns vcrsus butler" dilemma, can be modell~J as a dill'erential gam~. Cuuperatiun wuuld Icad to a muraturium on invcstment in weapuns, which currrvpun~ls tu a multilatcral arms treaty. Thc upcn-loup Nash cyuilibrium prc-,umes that cuuntrics cannut conditiun their investmcnts in arms on the rival's curr~nt wcapun~luck, wher~as the perfect Nash eyuilibrium presumes that lhcy c:~n. "fhc peiiict Nash eyuilibrium Icads to lower levels of arms uccumulatiun anJ murc "buttcr," su th:u it i~murc ellicicnt. l! fulluws that an unilalcral arms trcaly ahuulJ enable cuunUies tu ubscrvc lheir rival's wcapun stuck. Mureuvrr, Ihr prrfcct NaSh cyuilibrium gives a more satisfactury strategic fuun~atiun ul thc llich:ud~un cyuatiun~which shuws that invcstmcnt in arms incrca,~s prupurtiunal~ly with th~I~vcl uf wcapon stocks uf lhc rival natiun ("dcfcnce") and thc~c,ircJ wcapun Irad ("grirvancc" ur "halreJ") anJ decrcatics prupurliunatcly with Ihc rcunumic bw.tlcn ul its uwn wcapun atuck ("t:Uigue"). 1'hc d~sircd I~ad in wcapuñ tucl.~uv~r Ihc rival cuuntry and lhc rclalive priurily uf "guns" rathcr than "bultrr" pu,itivcly inllurncc Ihe griwancc cu~llicicnts anJ thcrefur~lh~stcaJy-COMPI:rIfIVE ARMS ACCUMULAIION tas state Icvels of weapun stucks. The discuunt rate, the depreciation rate anJ the r~L(tive priurity of "butter" ralher than "guns" negatively influence the dcfcnce cuellicicnts and thcrcl'ure the speed uf adjustment to lhe steady stale. The fatigue coellicients consist of the sum uf the defence coelTicients and the deprcciation rate.
'fh~re are several interesting directiuns for further research. The first direcliun is tu improve the micruccunomic fuundatiuns uf the ecunomic models of the West and thc East and to alluw for asymmetries in these models. For example, in the prescnt papcr the govcrnment of the West uses lump-sum taxation to finance the investment in weapons. Because such taxes are nondistortionary, the two economies are idcntical when technulogies and preferences are the same. However, whcn the government of the West has lo resurt to distortionary taxes on labuur income, thcn output, employment and consumption are lower in the West than in the East fur a given Icvel uf invcstment in weapons, and also the.steady-state level of weapun stucks is lower. Distortionary taxes considerably complicate the indirect utility and value functions, so that one has to resort to numerical methods for the calculatiun of subgame-pcrfect Nash equilibria (van der Plocg and de Zeeuw 1989). Obviuusly, a mure interesting model would not only allow for distortionary taxes but also fur money-and debt-finance of government investment in arms and for di[Tercnt technologies and preferences. To take another example, when wages and prices do not clcar thc labour and goods markets instantaneously, it may be reasonable to assume tha[ the Wcst is in a regime of Keynesian unemployment and Ihe East in a regime of repressed in0ation (Malinvaud 1977) . Since the West has an excess supply of labuur and goods, investment in weapons not only increases the feeling of security but has also Keynesian employment generating etTects. However, the East has an excess demand for labour and goods, so that investment in weapons increases the feeling of security at the expense of more rationing. The second directiun for furthcr rescarch is to alluw also for economic linkagcs between the two cuuntries, due tu bilateral trade flows and international capital movements. If thcre is nominal (real) wage rigidity in buth countries and if there are fluating exchange rates, government investment in weapons is a locomutive (beggarthy-neighbourl policy. lt follows that, in the absenee of international pulicy cuordination, government investment in weapons is tuo low (high) as the beneficial (adverse) eliccts on the rival cuuntry are ignored. Finally, the third directiun uf further rescarch is lo invcstigate when cuuperation in arms accumulation is cuunter-productivc. For example, when guvernment policy is timc-inconsistcnt duc tu, say, nominal wage rigidiry, cooperation can exacerbate the credibility cunstraints with respcct to the private sectur and therefore be cuuntcr-productive IlZubulT 19áS). 
